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I am inviting you to visit with me what one writer has called that
darkest of dark ages,  the day before yesterday.  We have just passed
through one of the most severe periods of boom and bust in farmland prices
in our history.  We are still too close to  the  experience to permit a
balanced interpretation of what happened, and why.  But it  does seem
appropriate  to distill  some tentative lessons  from these traumatic events,
and ask ourselves what we have learned that may be useful  in the future.
The discussion to  follow will focus  on the Midwest since  that  is  the
region in which the  amplitude of the boom and bust was  greatest, and it is
also  the  region for which historical data are most reliable.
II.  A Brief Look at the Scale of the  Boom and the  Bust
The  differential magnitudes of  the boom phase from 1972  to  1981 in
The Corn Belt, Lake  States,  and Northern Plains are shown in Table 1.  In
this period farmland values  increased approximately five-fold in Minnesota
and Iowa, and four-fold or more  in all of  the other leading Corn Belt
states.  The  smaller increases were  in Missouri, Kansas,  South Dakota, and
Michigan.
In the bust phase, which ran from 1981  to  1987  in all Corn Belt and
Lake  States,  the collapse of values was  an approximate reverse  image  of
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Percentage Increase in Value Per Acre of Farm Land and Buildings
March 1, 1972 to Peak, February 1, 1981
in U.S. Corn Belt, Northern Plains and Lake Statesa
Average Value Per
Acre, Land and Buildings  Percent Increase
State  1972  Peak in 1981 or 1982  Peak/1972
Dollars  Percent
Minnesota  241  1,281  531.5
Iowa  414  1,999  482.8
Indiana  435  2,031  466.9
North Dakota  98  455b  464.3
Nebraska  170  730b  429.4
Wisconsin  274  1,152  420.4
Illinois  522  2,188  419.2
Ohio  439  1,831  417.1
South Dakota  87  349b  401.1
Missouri  261  990  379.3
Kansas  174  628b  360.9
Michigan  370  1,289  348.4
a  U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, ERS, Farm Real Estate Market Developments,
CD-83, July 1978, and Agricultural Resources. Agricultural Land Values and
Markets. Situation and Outlook Report, AR-6, July 1987, p. 8.
b  Peak values were in 1981 for all Corn Belt and Lake States, but 1982 for
all Northern Plains States, (N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas).
2Table 2
Relative Decline in Average Value of Farm Land
Per Acre From Peak to 1987
in U.S. Corn Belt, Northern Plains and Lake Statesa
Price Per Acre  Percent  of
Average  Average  1987/  Peak Value
State  at PeakD  1987  Peak  Lost to 1987
Dollars Per Acre  %  %
Iowa  1,999  748  37.4  62.6
Minnesota  1,281  493  38.5  61.5
Indiana  2,031  931  45.8  54.2
Nebraska  730  335  45.9  54.1
Illinois  2,188  1,040  47.5  52.5
South Dakota  349  178  51.0  49.0
Ohio  1,831  942  51.4  48.6
Kansas  628  340  54.1  45.9
Wisconsin  1,152  626  54.3  45.7
Missouri  990  552  55.8  44.2
North Dakota  455  282  62.0  38.0
Michigan  1,289  833  64.6  35.4
a  U.S.  Dept.  of  Agriculture,  Economic  Research  Service,  Agricultural
Resources.  Agricultural  Land  Values  and Markets.  Situation  and  Outlook
Report, AR-6, July 1987, p. 8.
b  Peak values  were  in  1981  for  all  Corn  Belt  and Lake  States,  but  1982  for
all Northern Plains States, (N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Nebraska,  Kansas).
3the  boom, as  shown in Table 2.  The greatest declines were in Iowa and
Minnesota, where over  sixty percent of peak values were wiped out.  In the
remaining Corn Belt  states the wipe-out was  fifty percent or more.  In
general,  the greatest increases  in the boom and the  greatest declines  in
the bust occurred in regions with the most productive agricultural land.
The  land price boom and bust from 1972  to  1987 was  a prime-land
phenomenon.  This  sets  it  apart from other boom-and-bust periods  in the
history of farmland price movements  in the United States.  Our traditional
farmland price cycles up  to  the second World War had been triggered by
expansion into marginal or newly-settled lands.  This was a minor aspect
of the 1972-87 period.  In this  sense  it can be considered a misreading of
profit potentials  at the  intensive margins of agricultural  land use,
rather than at the  extensive margins.  Our most recent cycle  in farmland
prices  involved primarily the  rich, rather than the poor.  This  can be
read as  one measure of the extent to which American agriculture has  fully
matured.
III.  Sources  of Demand During  the Boom
The principal demand for land in the recent boom involved not only
the better lands but also the nearest neighbors.  Nationally, and at the
peak of the boom, farm owner-operators were buying two-thirds  of the  acres
sold, tenants ten to  twelve percent, and non-farmers approximately one-
fourth.  In the Lake States,  Corn Belt, and Northern Plains, owner-
operators bought  two-thirds to  three-fourths  of the  area transferred, and
non-farmers ten  to  twenty percent.  The predominant demand for land  in the
areas that experienced the greatest price  increases came from neighboring
4farmers, expanding the size of their operations.  In this  sense the
1970's land-price boom in the Midwest was home-grown (USDA, 1984).
Data for Minnesota provide the  clearest evidence of this trend to
market dominance by farm expansion buyers.  Figure 1 shows the
distribution of farmland purchases from 1954 to 1988 among three classes
of buyers:  Those buying to  expand an existing operation, those taking
over intact farm units as operating buyers, and investors who were neither
expansion buyers nor did they intend to be operators.  By the end of the
boom farm expansion buyers accounted for 75  to  80 percent of all farm
sales statewide.  In the  south central Corn Belt counties, where land
price increases had been most extreme, the figure approached 90 percent.
In these same counties, from 80  to  90 percent of all buyers lived within
10 miles of the tracts purchased  (Smith and Raup, 1983).
While comparable data are not available for other Midwestern states,
it seems reasonable to conclude that the driving force  in the  land boom
after 1972 was a search for economies of size by neighboring farmers.  In
this search they were apparently driven by a belief in ever-expanding
markets for farm products.  What accounted for this belief?
IV.  Understanding the Origins of the Land Boom
The early years of the 1970's mark a hinge-point in our perception of
food-supply and environmental problems in a world-wide dimension.  Three
events  in 1972 and 1973  dramatized this  shift:
a.)  The unexpected appearance of the Soviet Union in the world grain
market as a major importer.
b.)  The formation of OPEC and its  subsequent embargo of petroleum
sales  to the U.S.  and other nations.
5Figure  1
Percentage  of Farm  Sales  by Type  of  Buyer,  Minnesota,  1954-1988
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6c.)  The publication of the book "The Limits  to Growth"  (Meadows, et
al,  1972)  and the resultant wide publicity given to the
presumption of physical supply constraints on further resource
use.
The catalyzing effect of these events occurred in a setting created
by a world-wide concern with the consequences of explosive population
growth.  The rhetoric of the era was apocalyptic.  Paul Ehrlich
popularized the notion of a "Population Bomb,"  waiting to explode, and
concluded in the  late 1960's  that "it  is  already too late to prevent a
drastic  rise in the death rate through starvation"  (Ehrlich,  1968,  p. 3).
Garrett Hardin wrote of the  "Tragedy of the Commons",  concluding that
freedom to breed is  intolerable and that we must recognize  "the necessity
of abandoning the commons in breeding"  (Hardin, 1979,  p. 1248).  Kenneth
Boulding wrote in space-age metaphor of the  limits  imposed by "spaceship
earth",  providing those concerned with land resources with one of their
most evocative  symbols  (Boulding, 1966).
The central premise  of the concern with resource limits  lies in what
can be called the  "finite assumption".  The notion that the earth's supply
of all resources  is  fixed seems  so self-evident that it can be asserted
with no proof needed.  Yet it  is  this finite assumption that must be
questioned.
In terms of  the measurements used to  estimate resource supply, there
can be no resources until they are recognized by human beings.  Quantity
cannot be measured except in terms  of the use  to which the resource can be
put.  These uses,  in turn, are functions of perception, rates of
recovery, costs  of transport, efficiency in conversion, prices,  and
7consumer tastes.  These change, and the available stock of resources
changes with them.
A stock of resources  is  thus  inadequately measured in terms of
physical quantities.  In economic terms, the stock does not exist until it
can be used by human beings.  A resource, in this view, is a cultural
achievement, for which the proper measurement units can only be defined in
terms of our  intelligence and skill  in putting resources to use.  At any
one  time,  intelligence and skills are limited.  But the history of the
human race provides no evidence that they are fixed or finite over time.
If resources can only be defined in terms of human intelligence, and if
this  is not finite, then the stock of resources cannot be finite.
This  is  the lesson that was forgotten or rejected in the build-up  to
the land-boom of the 1970's.  The participants in that boom may never have
heard Will Rogers dispense his  famous advice  to  "buy land, they ain't
making it any more", but they acted on that belief.  Overriding any
calculations of tangible profits from land appreciation or economies of
size was a profound belief that the world was running out of land.
Relearning the lesson that economic land  is made, not discovered, and that
its  supply is not properly measured in acres,  is perhaps the most
important lesson taught by the  recent land boom and bust.
V.  Fueling the  Boom
A belief in the ultimate wisdom of buying farm land was not confined
to farmers, it infused their creditors as  well.  Almost by definition,
booms in any market run on credit and the land boom of  the  1970's was no
exception.  Throughout the life of the boom credit was never a constraint.
Instead, it  fueled the boom.
8Until well  into the  1960's credit-financed farmland transfers rarely
exceeded 60 percent of all transfers for the US  as  a whole, and the  ratio
of debt to purchase price was typically under two-thirds.  Both of these
ratios  rose in the  late 1960's,  and reached unprecedented levels in the
1970's.  By the end of the boom, credit-financed transfers accounted for
93  to  95 percent of all  transfers in the Corn Belt, Lake States, and
Northern Plains, and ratios of debt to purchase price ranged in these
three regions from 79  to  83  percent (USDA, 1984, pp.  26,  28).  Land
market-related debt on this  scale had never before been recorded in the
United States.  In this  dimension the farmland boom of  the 1970's was
unique in U.S. history.  It reflected an intense drive for market share by
farmland creditors, and especially by the Federal land Banks.
Total outstanding farm real estate debt as  of January 1 (excluding
real estate debt held by farm households) increased 3.9  times  from 1970  to
the peak in 1984-1985.  In that same period farm real estate  debt held by
Federal Land Banks increased 7.4  times,  that held by the Farmers Home
Administration 4.5  times, by banks 3.0 times, by individuals and others
2.8  times,  and by life insurance companies 2.2  times  (Federal Reserve
Bank, Dec.  1984).  The major shift  in market shares was  to the Federal
Land Banks, and in smaller degree to  the Farmers Home Administration.  The
greatest proportionate losses  in market shares were by life insurance
companies, individuals  and others, and commercial banks, in that order, as
shown in Table 3.
The dominant position of the  Federal Land Banks  in farm real estate
mortgage lending was  one of the most distinctive characteristics  of the
land boom of the  1970's.  For  twenty years, from 1948  through 1967,  life
insurance companies had held the predominant share of farm real estate
9Table 3:  Shifts in Market Share of Outstanding Real Estate Debt of Farm
Businesses as of January  1, 1970 and  1985
(excluding Real  Estate Debt of Farm Households)
1970  1985
Debt in  Percent  Debt in  Percent
Lender Category  Millions of  of  Millions of  of
Dollars  Total  Dollars  Total




Federal Land Banks  5,977  22.8  44,300  43.4
Farmers Home Adm.  2,029  7.7  9,100  8.9
FLB plus FmHA  8,006  30.5  53,400  52.3
Banks  3,116  11.9  9,400  9.2
Life Insurance Co.  5,222  19.9  11,700  11.5
Individuals and
Others  9,902  37.8  27,500  27.0
Agricultural Finance Data Book, Research  Division, Federal Reserve Bank,
Washington, D.C., December  1984, p. 21.  Debt peaked nationally at $102,821 million
in 1984, but somewhat later in many of the major farming regions.
10debt.  They were overtaken by the Land Banks in 1968,  at first slowly and
then with a rush after 1970.  In the twenty years from 1966 through 1985,
the Land Banks  increased their market share  in every year except 1984,
from 20.0 percent in 1966  to 43.4 percent in 1985.
The pattern of shifts  among other debt holders shows  interesting
variations.  The  share of outstanding debt held by commercial banks was
remarkably constant at 12  to  13  percent throughout the 1960's and 1970's.
Their share of total farm business real estate debt  in 1979 was almost
exactly the same as  in 1970.  It declined briefly in 1980-83 and then
began a rise that  is still continuing.
In contrast, life insurance companies lost market share  in every year
from 1966 through 1985 except  in 1978  and 1979.  This  suggests  that the
less  aggressive policies  of life insurance companies  in farm real estate
lending  in the early years of the land boom were reversed in the mid-
1970's.  They undoubtedly found themselves at  the end of the boom with a
disproportionate number of mortgages written late in the boom at  the high
end of the cycle  in land prices and interest rates.
This  leads  to  some reflections on the methods used by creditors  in
valuing farmland.  A now-conventional approach is  to use a bid-price
model, in which the traditional capitalization formula  is modified to  take
expectations of future trends  in revenues  and interest  rates  into account.
This encounters difficulties in periods of rapid inflation.
A change in the expected real rate of inflation does not lead to  an
increase in land values,  if interest rates  are free to adjust to take the
expected rate of inflation into account.  The  increase  in the expected
rate of inflation will be approximately canceled out by the rise  in the
11expected nominal  rate of interest, leaving the  real rate of interest
unchanged.  But what happens  if the  expected real  rates of interest turn
negative?
In theory, this  is  not supposed to happen.  In a fully functioning
capital market nominal  interest rates are presumed to adjust to
expectations  of inflation rapidly enough  to maintain a positive real rate
of return to capital.
In fact, negative real rates of  interest do occur.  Real rates of
interest on Federal Land Bank farm mortgage  loans were negative in 18  of
the  32 quarters  from 1973  through 1981.
If the expected rate of  inflation is large enough and persistent
enough to lead  to expectations  that the real rate of  interest will become
negative, then capital will have no cost. The bid-price model breaks down.
Dividing an expected positive real rate of return to  farm assets  (land) by
an expected negative real rate of  interest leads  to  a nonsense result.
If  there are differentials  in the speed with which nominal  interest
rates adjust  to expectations of  inflation in various  sectors of the
economy, then  the effects of inflation will be most pronounced in those
sectors that are slowest  to adjust.  In the U.S.,  the  farm mortgage loan
sector has been especially slow to  adjust nominal rates of interest when
confronting inflation.  This  increased the  attractiveness of  the use  of
credit to purchase farm land in the  1970's,  thus providing one of  the best
ways  to benefit from  the tendency for nominal  interest rates  to  lag behind
the market in a period of rising inflation.
A key lesson taught by the land boom of the  1970's  is  that the FLB,
the insurance companies, and other lenders  fed inflationary tendencies by
failing to  raise  interest rates  fast enough and high enough to  maintain a
12positive real rate of return on capital.  Market share can be achieved at
a price that  is  too high.
One additional  lesson taught by the land boom  is a new appreciation
of the power of  anticipated capital gains,  in nominal dollars,  to blind
people to  the trends in real income, measured in deflated dollars.  This
is  illustrated in Figures  2 and 3.
In corn-soybean counties of southwestern Minnesota real cash  farm
income per crop acre peaked in 1974 and fell almost continuously  to  1984.
In contrast, real  land values per acre peaked in 1979,  five years after
the peak in real cash income per crop acre.
In nominal dollars, cash  income per crop acre peaked in 1974 and
fluctuated thereafter  in a rather narrow range of between approximately
$80  and $110  per crop acre throughout the fifteen years  from 1974  through
1988.  During the land boom period, which in southwestern Minnesota lasted
from 1972  to  1983, both nominal and real cash income per crop acre rose
only in the first three years, 1972-1974.  In the years of greatest land
boom activity, the trend  in nominal cash income per  crop acre was
essentially flat and the trend in real income was falling sharply.
One tentative conclusion is  that, except for the first three years,
those valuing land for purchase or for credit were capitalizing expected
future capital gains  into bid prices  or appraisals.
A second tentative conclusion is  that conventional approaches to  land
valuation are irrelevant  in a period of growing inflation.  Psychological
considerations  take command, and the boom feeds on itself.  In the absence
of  sharp credit rationing, the interest rate loses  its power to  guide
13Figure  2
Trends  in  Land  Prices  per  Acre'  and  Net  Cash  Farm  Income  per Crop  Acreb,  Southwestern  Minnesota,  1970-1988
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14Figure  3
Trends  in  Land  Prices  per  Acre'  and  Net  Cash  Farm  Income  per
Crop  Acreb  (Deflated  by (CPI,  1982-84),  Southwestern  Minnesota,
1970-1988
Regional Average Sales Prices Of
Deflated Dollars  Farmland Per Acre (left hand  scale).
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15investment decisions.  In one often-quoted phrase, "credit loses  its
guardian."  This characterized the boom in farmland prices in the  1970's.
VI.  A Concluding Reflection on the Growing Linkage
Between the Markets  for Farmland
and Housing
The major trend in land use in the United States since the Second
World War has been the expansion of non-farm residences into formerly
rural areas.  The rural non-farm population now outnumbers  the rural farm
population in all but a few of the counties that have in the past been
classified as agricultural.  This  is true of all counties in the Lake
States, and of virtually all counties  in the Corn Belt.  One result has
been to  superimpose urban and residential concepts of land values on top
of land values deemed justified by agricultural use.
The  farmland market is being penetrated by the housing market,
unevenly but on a massive  scale.  This  introduces housing market risk
into areas that in the past had valued land in terms of agricultural risk
only.  The significance of this  added risk element  is  intensified by the
fact that, with the exception of New England and the "Rust Belt"  areas
around the Great Lakes, the market for housing land has been relatively
stable to buoyant for the past 50 years.  Nothing comparable  in scale to
the collapse of farmland values from 1981  to 1987 has occurred in the
suburban and rural non-farm housing market.
This may be about to change, for demographic reasons.  Housing market
studies show clearly that the demand side of the market is  driven by
individuals  in the age group of 25  through 34.  The overwhelming majority
of first homes are acquired in this 10-year period in the life cycle.
16The post-war baby boom in the United States led to an increase  in
annual births of 50 percent from 1945  to  the peak in 1957, and held births
above 4.0 million annually for eleven years, from 1954 through 1964.  The
decline was almost equally dramatic, from an annual peak of 4.3 million
births in 1957  to a low of 3.1 million in 1973.  The trends are shown in
Figure 4.
The effect on housing demand has been unprecedented.  Adding 25 years
to the figures on annual births, as  is done  in Figure 5, shows that the
boom in farm land prices from 1972  to  1981 coincided almost exactly with
the period of maximum increase in the population reaching "housing ages."
From 1960  to 1982  the age groups that contributed most heavily to housing
demand had increased in almost every year.  The  annual increment remained
near or above 4.0 million from 1973  to 1989, but will fall sharply to a
low of just over 3.0 million in 1998.
In the next ten years the annual population of first-home buyers will
fall by about one-fourth.  This  introduces  the prospect of a glut in
"starter homes" and a reduction in overall housing demand on a scale that
we have never before experienced.
While the collapse of farmland prices after 1981 had only minimal
impact on the demand for housing land, and may even have increased it,
this relationship  is not symmetrical.  The prospect of downward pressure
on farmland prices due  to a collapsing housing market is very real.  The
authors of a recent study of the prospective housing market for the
National Bureau of Economic Research concluded that "housing demand will
grow more slowly in the 1990's than in any time in the past forty years"
(Mankiw and Weil,  1988).  We have no  data to enable us  to estimate the
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especially in the  eastern Corn Belt and Lake States.  While the collapse
of the boom in farmland prices  in the  1980s did not drag down the housing
market, there  is a strong prospect that the housing market will contribute
a major element of variability to  the  farmland market in the Midwest for
the remainder of  this century.
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